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Abstract
Deregulation is a basic component of school reform. Without
deregulation, schools could not respond to the incentive changes at the heart
of more sophisticated reform proposals. Therefore, understanding the effects
of deregulation on various interest groups provides insight into the political
dynamics of the broader reform debate.
In tnis paper, we simulate the likely impacts of deregulation. The
simulation indicates that parents and students in poor school districts with a
relatively high proportion of minority students are resource constrained
rather than bounded by regulation in pursing better education for their
students. The potential gains from deregulation increase as property wealth
and expenditures per student increase. The simulation also indicates that in
regulation-constrained school districts, many education professionals are
extracting rents (in terms of excess employment) from the current system, and
that deregulation and incentives for increased efficiency would lead many
school districts to substitute teacher aides for teachers, administrators, and
professional staff.
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for helpful comments and suggestions.In the decade since the publication of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative
for Educational Reform (Gardner et al., 1983), Americans have become
increasingly concerned about improving education. Many types of reform have
been proposed to address these concerns. Yet, despite all the rhetoric, few
signs of substantive change are evident. In part,the ~e1ay in changing the
school system reflects uncertainty about the relative efficacy of the various
reform proposals. But in the minds of many of the reformers, too much of the
delay reflects opposition from interest groups that do not expect to benefit
from reform (for example, see Chubb and Moe 1990).
In this paper, we use simulation techniques to examine the
distributional consequences of a basic component of educational reform --
eliminating regulations on the allocation of school personnel. Without
deregulation, schools would be unable to respond to the incentives offered by
more sophisticated reform proposals such as voucher plans or site-based
management. Thus, understanding the effects of deregulation on various
interest groups provides insight into the political dynamics of the broader
reform debate.
A priori, we expect that some schools efficiently allocate their
resources despite the regulations. Producing higher educational outcomes at
these schools would require additional expenditures. We refer to these
schools as resource constrained. The remaining schools are regulation
constrained. We expect that deregulation would lead to a reallocation of
resources and higher educational outcomes at these schools. For the
regulation-constrained schools, we also expect that some types of personnel
are earning economic rents from the status quo and would be employed less
intensively after reform. Necessarily, other types of personnel would be
employed more intensively.
1Classifying schools and personnel types in this way reveals the likely
supporters and opponents of reform. Residents of regulation-constrained
school districts would logically support deregulation, as would personnel
groups that would be employed more intensively in the absence of regulation.
Residents .of res0uroe-constrained school" districts·are likely to favor reforms
that redistribute resources over reforms that deregulate schools.
Furthermore, if relative differences in school quality are capitalized into
property values, then residents of resource-constrained school districts might
oppose deregulation because it would erode their position relative to
regulation-constrained school districts. Finally, one would expect that
personnel groups that are currently overemployed relative to their
compensation would anticipate losses in employment after deregulation and
would rationally oppose it.
Our simulated deregulation of public school districts in Texas indicates
that most school districts are regulation constrained rather than resource
constrained, a conclusion that is perfectly consistent with the state
legislature's tendency to micromanage education. 1 The simulation also
indicates that school administrators, teachers and professional staff (such as
counselors) are likely to lose employment through deregulation, while teacher
aides are likely to gain employment. Finally, the simulation reveals that
resource-constrained school districts differ significantly from regulation-
constrained districts. In general, resource-constrained school districts have
a greater proportion of minority and low income students, less property wealth
per pupil and lower per pupil expenditures.
1 For example, the legislature sets hiring standards, maximum class
sizes and teacher compensation schedules.
2These results suggest that reform will remain an important issue because
it benefits large, politically influential groups of parents. However, even
basic reforms like deregulation may continue to be difficult to achieve
because teachers and other members of the educational establishment are better
organized than the likely beneficiaries of such reform.
T. The Literature
A substantial literature illustrates inefficiencies in the education
system. Eric A. Hanushek's 1986 survey of the literature on educational
production functions overwhelmingly concludes that expenditures are
uncorrelated with student achievement gains. Cost function studies and data
envelopment analyses also indicate that the system is inefficient (see, for
example, Bessent et al. 1982, Fare, et al. 1989 or Callan and Santerre 1990).
The literature also points to regulation as one of the sources of
inefficiency. For example, despite considerable evidence that smaller class
sizes and more-educated teachers do not promote achievement (Hanushek 1986),
governments like the Texas state legislature continue to regulate class sizes
and teacher credentials.
Fortunately, by exploiting the characteristics of our theoretical model,
we can infer from data observed in a regulated environment how resources could
be allocated if the regulations were removed. This technique allows us to
make three important contributions to the literature. First, we simulate a
deregulated environment and measure the potential outcome gain over the status
quo, thereby differentiating between the resource-constrained school districts
(those that are unable to improve via deregulation) and the regulation-
constrained school districts (those that would improve with deregulation).
Second, we examine community characteristics to determine if particular types
3of school districts are disproportionately classified as regulation
constrained and therefore harmed by regulation. Finally, to support our
conjectures concerning impediments to reform, we use information on the
deregulated personnel allocation to measure the extent of economic rents
accruing to school district personnel from the status quo
II. The Model
We model educational decision-making under the status quo and under
deregulation using the direct and indirect distance functions, respectively.
Distance functions accommodate agents seeking to maximize output in both a
regulated environment with input constraints and a deregulated environment
with merely a budget constraint. This approach also allows for the status quo
resource allocation to be nested within the budget constrained resource
allocation so that the deregulation can be appropriately simulated.
Although most analyses of education use either a cost or production
function approach, we feel neither of these is appropriate for the problem at
hand. First, cost function estimation presumes that the decision maker is
attempting to minimize cost, while public sector officials are trying to
maximize output. Because production functions are single-output
representations of technology, they have limited use in modeling multioutput
education technologies. In neither case can the cost or production function
provide a straightforward and comparable simulation of the status quo and
deregulated environment.
To model the regulated status quo, we use the direct output distance
function. As described by Shephard (1970), the direct output distance
function can be defined as
4(1)
where Xf is a vector of fixed input quantities, Xv is a vector of variable
input quantities, y is a vector of output quantities, and 1/0 gives the
proportion by which all outputs can be expanded and still remain feasible
given the direct production possibilities set, P(Xf,Xv).2 As in a regulated
environment, the input vector X~(Xf' Xv) is treated as exogenously determined
in this description of technology. We assume that administrators initially
face this technology under the regulated organizational structure.
We use the indirect output distance function to model a deregulated
educational environment in which administrators face a budget constraint but
are free to choose their variable inputs as long as they satisfy that budget
constraint. Shephard (1974) defines the indirect output distance function as
(2)
where c is total variable cost, Pv is a vector of variable-input prices, and
III is the maximum proportion by which all outputs can be expanded and still
be feasible given the indirect (budget-constrained) production possibilities
set, IP(xf,Pvlc). The set IP(xf,Pvlc) is the largest production possibility
set allowing Xv to vary while satisfying the budget constraint (Pv'Xv ~ C).3
Figure 1 illustrates the direct and indirect output distance functions
for a typical school district that produces two outputs. The set P(Xf'Xv)'
which describes the best practice technology under the status quo, gives all
possible combinations of the two outputs that can be produced with the
2 By definition, all of the elements of the X and y vectors are contained
in the nonnegative real line.
3 This interpretation of IP(.) was first established in Fare and
Shephard (1980).
5regulated input bundle (Xf'Xv)' Suppose that a particular school district has
observed output bundle A, which it produces from its given input bundle XA'
The direct distance function tells us how far that observed bundle is from the
frontier of the direct technology, P(Xf'Xv)' holding the mix of outputs
constant. The direct distance function (Do(Xf'Xv'y» equals the ratio OA/OU,
where U represents the maximum output feasible within P(Xf'Xv)' given the
observed output mix and input bundle (i.e., the status quo). The inverse of
this ratio (1/0) can be interpreted as a measure of technical efficiency.
The set IP(xf,Pvlc) , which describes the deregulated technology, gives
all the possible combinations of two outputs that can be produced given the
school district's budget constraint (c) and variable-input prices (Pv). The
school district is allowed to choose variable inputs as long as Xv satisfies
the budget constraint. Because IP(xf,Pvlc) offers more choices than P(Xf'Xv)'
P(Xf'Xv) is a subset of IP(xf,Pvlc). The indirect output distance function
(IDo(Xf,Pvlc,y» tells us how far the observed output bundle is from the
frontier of the indirect or budget-constrained (deregulated) technology,
IP(xf,Pvlc). In Figure 1, IDo(Xf,Pvlc,y) equals the ratio OA/OT.
The direct and indirect distance functions have several useful
properties. They take on values less than or equal to one as long as y is
feasible. Values of one indicate that observed output is on the boundary of




1 = Y E P(Xf'Xv)
1 = Y E Isoq P(Xf'Xv)
IDo(Xf' Pvlc, y) ,,1 = Y E IP(Xf' pjc)
IDo(Xf' Pvlc, y) 1 = Y E Isoq IP(Xf' Pvlc)'
6indicate that the particular school district is technically efficient in the
sense of Farrell (1957).5
Because relaxing constraints necessarily allows for greater potential
output, allowing school districts to choose inputs subject to a budget
constraint inste-ad-o-f facing the initial,regulatedinput' vee-tor may increase
their output. We can simulate the potential increase from deregulation by
exploiting the relationship between the direct and indirect output distance
functions:
(3)
The relationship reflects the fact that a deregulated school district could
always choose the input bundle it uses under the status quo and potentially
could increase output in a deregulated environment.
For this analysis, we measure the gains in potential output from this
simulated deregulation as the ratio of the maximum potential output
achievable in the deregulated environment (y/A) , divided by the maximum
potential output achievable in the regulated environment (y/O):
(4)
Thus, the measure of gain from deregulation represents additional potential
output above and beyond that which could be achieved by becoming technically
efficient given the initial allocation (in the sense of Farrell). In Figure
1, GAIN is represented by aT/aU.
The school district represented in Figure 1 as point A is an example of
a regulation-constrained observation. The potential output lost due to
regulation for this school district is measured by OT/OU (GAIN). If a school
5In fact, the direct output distance function is the reciprocal of
Farrell output-increasing technical efficiency.
7district is observed at a point like T, then it is termed resource constrained
because it is unable to improve on its resource allocation in response to
deregulation. That is, the school district's resource decisions have not been
changed by the regulation, and the only way to increase educational outcomes
is to provide additional ~esources, perhaps ,through reform that redistributes
revenues among school districts.
The next step is to develop a technique for measuring GAIN. First we
must obtain measures of inputs, input prices and outputs as well as the budget
constraint for a set of observations. Then we need to compute the values of
Do and IDo for each observation in the data set.
The Data
We apply the distance-function approach described in the previous
section to a sample of 144 urban Texas school districts operating in 1989.
The sample includes school districts with enrollments between 1,000 and 5,000
for which complete data were available. We restrict the sample to urban
school districts of moderate size because we wanted to choose a subset of
school districts with a common educational technology.· Anecdotal information
suggests that very large and very small school districts face substantially
different production technologies. Data on school district inputs corne from
the Texas Research League. We extract estimates of school district outputs
and quasi-fixed inputs that are beyond school district control from data
provided by the Texas Education Agency.
Our data on school district inputs includes four variable inputs --
administrators (AD), teachers (TEACH), professional support staff (SUP) and
6 As the empirical appendix illustrates, the analysis is robust to a
number of data specifications.
8teaching aides (AIDE) -- and one quasi-fixed capital input -- operating and
maintenance expenditures (MAINT). The input price data consists of average
annual salaries paid to school administrators, teachers, support staff and
teacher aides. Because we consider the capital input as quasi-fixed and
beyond school ·di~trict control in the shuTt Tun, therelevarit measure of the
budget each school district faces is the total cost per student of hiring the
four personnel inputs.
The literature on measuring school effects has reached a broad consensus
that the most appropriate measure of schooling product is the marginal effect
of the school on educational outcomes (see, for example, Hanushek 1986,
Hanushek and Taylor 1990, Aitkin and Longford 1986 or Boardman and Murnane
1979). We use student achievement on a battery of test scores as the relevant
educational outcome and extract the marginal effect of schools by follOWing
the value-added residuals techniques described in Hanushek and Taylor and
Aitkin and Longford.
Thus, we estimate school district output, using Texas Educational
Assessment of Minimum Skills (TEAMS) scores in mathematics, reading and
writing; data on changes in cohort size; and demographic data on the racial
and socioeconomic composition of the student body (Texas Education Agency
1987, 1989). For each of four grade levels--3rd, 5th, 9th and llth--we
estimate the value added by the school district according to equation (5):
93
TEAMS89i ,g = "g + L OJ ,gETHNICITYi ,J + 04,gSESi + OS,gXCOHORTi,g +
j-I
8
L OJ,gTEAMS87i ,J,g_2 + €i,O' g=3,5,9,l1,
J-6
where TEAMS89i.g is the average total TEAMS score for school district i for
(5)
grade level g in 1989, TEAMS87 i ,j.g_2 is the average TEAMS score in subject j
(reading, writing and mathematics) for the same cohort two years earlier,
ETHNICITYi,j is the fraction of the student body of school district i that is
Asian, black or Hispanic (respectively), SESi is the fraction of the student
body of school district i that is receiving free or reduced-price lunches (the
best available proxy for socioeconomic status), XCOHORTi,g is the percentage
change in the size of the grade g cohort between 1987 and 1989 (a control to
prevent schools from improving their average score by shedding students), and
the estimated residual, Ci,gl represents the average value added in school
district i in grade g.7 We present these equation estimates in Table 1. 8
Estimating school outputs as equation residuals generates output
measures that represent deviations from the state average. School districts
that add less value than the state average have negative output measures.
Because our computational technique is not designed for negative outputs, we
transform the value-added residuals into tractable output measures by adding
7 We expected a correlation between school effects across grade levels
in the same school district and, therefore, a cross-equations correlation
between the error terms. We found that the correlations between error terms
were surprisingly low (in the neighborhood of 0.20) but significant, and
therefore we estimated the output measures simultaneously using the standard
SAS package for seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).
8 These estimates are calculated using all 604 Texas school districts
for which we had test data. This approach greatly increases the degrees of
freedom with which OUTPUT and STUINPUT are measured. In restricting the
sample for further analysis to medium-sized, urban school districts, we
implicitly assume that the coefficients of equation 5 are stable across all
sub-samples of our data.
10the estimated value of the intercept from each equation to the value-added
residual for that equation. Therefore, y is measured by:
A A
OUTPUT i,S = (kg + E L,g'
In additian to estimates of marginal school effects, equation 5 also
yields estimates of predicted achievement for school districts. In this
(6)
setting, predicted achievement is attributable to student body characteristics
that are beyond school district control in the current period. Formally,
3
STUINPUTi,g E 6j ,g ETHNICITYL + 64,g SESi + 65,g XCOHORTi,g
j-l
8
+ E bj,g TEA11S87i ,j,g_2'
j-6
Thus, the STUINPUTi,g measures the contribution of home and previous
school production, which we treat as quasi-fixed inputs (Xf), i.e., inputs
(7)
over which the school district has no control. Our proxy of the value added
by the school district, OUTPUT 1,g from equation 6, is achievement purged of
the effects of home production and earlier achievement-test gains.
9
Table 2 includes descriptive statistics for each of the four variable
school district inputs, one fixed school district input, four fixed household
inputs, four outputs, enrollment and costs. These statistics, especially the
means and standard deviations, indicate that teacher-pupil ratios vary less
than the ratios of the other types of personnel to enrollment, reflecting
perhaps de facto restrictions on class size. Personnel expenditures per pupil
(VARCaST) vary from a low of about $1,300 to a high of nearly $3,000 per year.
9 We note that this general technique was also employed by Callan and
Santerre (1990) to arrive at a measure of educational quality. However,
Callan and Santerre did not have access to pretest information and, therefore,
were unable to derive a value-added quality measure.
11The Empirical Results
We calculate Do(Xf'Xv'y) and IDo(Xf'Pv/c,y) for each school district in
our sample, using the nonparametric linear programming approach described in
the technical appendix. In calculating Do(Xf'Xv'y), all inputs are treated as
fixed by the regulations. In calculating IDo(Xf'Pv/c,y), we allow the school
district to hypothetically choose the levels of the four types of personnel,
subject to a budget constraint equal to the total personnel expenditure per
pupil observed in the school district. We solve for the optimal variable
input levels as part of the problem (see appendix). Input prices are assumed
fixed at the observed salary averages, and the technologies are assumed to
exhibit constant returns to scale."O For both direct and indirect output
distance functions, a school district is judged efficient (i.e., its students
are reaching best practice achievement levels, given its resources) if the
value of the distance function is one. Inefficient school districts will have
measures less than one. These school districts are not reaching best practice
achievement levels.
GAIN (Do(Xf,Xv,y)/IDo(Xf'Pv/c,y)) in Table 3. On average, the maximum
proportion by which output could be expanded under regulation, (Do(Xf,Xv,y))-l
is 1.032. Under deregulation, the average maximum proportion by which output
could be expanded, (IDo(Xf,Pv/C,y))-l is 1.074. The average potential gain
from allowing school districts to choose variable inputs subject to budget
constraints rather than taking their initial variable input levels as fixed is
1.041. That is, on average, school districts could increase value added by
3.2 percent «Do(Xf,Xv,y))-l - 1) if they used their initial input bundle
10 As the empirical appendix indicates, relaxing this assumption leads to
qualitatively similar results.
12efficiently and an additional 4.1 percent if they could reallocate inputs
efficiently. 11 Given constant returns to scale, a potential 4.1 percent gain
in output from reallocating personnel inputs implies that deregulated school
districts could reduce personnel expenditures by 4.1 percent without reducing
output. Regulation-constrained sctrool-distri'cts could irtcrea--se their output
by 4.9 percent, on average, if the regulations were removed. Thus, the
simulation suggests that regulations on resource allocation add substantially
to the cost of education in Texas.
Because solving the indirect output distance function yields the
variable input vector each school district would choose if it were not subject
to the'iJiitial regulatory environment, (X/), we can also use it to identify
the personnel groups that would gain and lose employment under deregulation
and the distribution of economic rents in the initial allocation.'2 An input
is said to be earning economic rents when that input's price exceeds its
marginal product or, equivalently, when it is overutilized relative to its
compensation.
Table 4 describes the aggregate effects of deregulation on the 144
school districts in our sample. The first line of table 4 gives the total
initial expenditures on each of the four variable inputs. The second line of
the table illustrates how school districts would redistribute their initial
budgets after deregulation. The expenditures for each personnel category
represent optimal input quantities multiplied by the (given) input prices
11 In a related study using parametric estimation techniques, Grosskopf,
Hayes, Taylor and Weber (1992) find a greater degree of inefficiency (on the
order of 25 percent for the indirect output distance function case). We
attribute the difference in magnitudes of technical inefficiency to the
differences in technique.
12 The optimal variable input vector is the solution to problem A2 in
the technical appendix.
13(PjXVj*), summed across all school districts in the sample. The third line of
the table indicates how deregulated school districts would allocate their
expenditures if their variable budget equaled the minimum amount necessary to
achieve the initial output level in a deregulated environment. We determine
the minimum-var,iable-cost --budget by exploiting the propertie'sof the indirect
output distance function. Recall that the indirect output distance function
indicates that school districts could increase output by an average of 7.4
percent by becoming technically efficient in a deregulated environment.
Assuming constant returns to scale, this implies that the school districts
could maintain their initial levels of output and decrease personnel
expenditures by 7.4 percent. For each school district, the minimum personnel
expenditure needed to achieve the initial output level in a deregulated
environment would be IDo(Xf,Pv!c,y).VARCOST. As before, the optimal variable-
input vector (Xv') indicates the optimal mix of inputs under deregulation
(assuming constant returns to scale). Thus, the expenditures for each
personnel category represent optimal input quantities multiplied by the
(given) input prices and scaled by the value of the indirect output distance
function (IDo(Xf,Pv!c,y)'PjXVj'), summed across all school districts in the
sample.
One conclusion we draw from this simulation is that there are
substantial economic rents to protect from school reform. Comparing lines 1
and 3 in Table 4, one can see that deregulated school districts could reduce
their aggregate personnel expenditures by $49.6 million without reducing
output from initial levels. The simulation indicates that expenditures on
teachers could decrease by 9 percent (or $41.3 million), expenditures on
administrators by 21 percent and expenditures on professional support staff by
20 percent without reducing student achievement, provided that expenditures on
14teacher aides increased. Because teacher aides are highly productive relative
to their compensation, expenditures on aides would need to increase by 67
percent ($20.4 million) to maintain initial output levels. Apparently,
teachers, administrators and support staff are earning economic rents, while
teacher aides are severely underutilized.
A second conclusion we draw from the simulation is that as a group
education professionals are rational to oppose school deregulation. The
current dissatisfaction with student achievement makes it likely that school
districts would respond to deregulation by increasing output, subject to their
initial budget constraints. Comparing lines 1 and 2 in Table 4 indicates that
if initial funding levels were maintained but schools were deregulated, school
districts would reallocate resources away from teachers, administrators and
professional staff and toward teacher aides. While expenditures on teachers
would decline less than 1 percent, expenditures on administrators and
professional support staff would decline 15 percent and 14 percent,
respectively.
A third conclusion we can draw from the simulation is that the
consequences of deregulation are not monolithic. Total employment of
teachers, administrators and professional staff would decline if school
districts were allowed to reallocate resources, but the simulation does not
imply that all school districts overutilize education professionals. Comparing
the initial variable-input vector, (Xv), to the optimal variable-input vector,
(Xv'), reveals that nearly 30 percent of the school districts would respond to
deregulation by increasing teacher employment, indicating that teachers are
underutilized in those jurisdictions. A similar proportion of jurisdictions
would increase hiring of professional staff. Although administrators as a
15class are substantially overutilized, 21 school districts would hire more
administrators if allowed to do so.
Like school district personnel, parents, students and other area
residents have an interest in school reform. The simulation also allows us to
identify the household characteristics of school districts that would change
under deregulation. We hypothesize that voters would favor deregulation in
school districts where the simulation indicates that output would increase
under deregulation (or expenditures would fall). Because many people expect
relative school quality and school taxes to be capitalized into property
values, and because school districts that did not improve under deregulation
would see their relative quality/tax positions deteriorate, we also predict
voter opposition in school districts that the simulation indicates would not
improve with deregulation.
We find an interesting pattern in the distribution of school districts
that would and would not gain from deregulation (Table 5). Our simulation
indicates that 25 school districts are resource constrained and are already as
efficient as they would be under deregulation, while 119 school districts
would gain from deregulation. On average, the school districts that would
gain from deregulation (regulation-constrained districts) have fewer minority
students, fewer students receiving reduced-price lunches, higher property
values and higher expenditures per pupil than school districts that would not
gain from deregulation (resource-constrained districts).'3 Furthermore, the
amount by which a school district would gain from deregulation is a decreasing
function of that district's state aid and an increasing function of its
13 Student's t-tests of the difference between means for these household
characteristics indicate that school districts that would gain from
deregulation are significantly different from school districts that would not
gain.
16property wealth and expenditures. One would expect the resource-constrained
districts to support reform that redistributes resources across districts
rather than the within-district reallocation induced by deregulation.
Our simulation indicates that the primary beneficiaries of school
deregulation would be teacher aides and affluent, white school districts.
Groups that would not gain from deregulation include the education
professionals and resource-constrained school districts, which are typically
poorer, minority school districts. Therefore, we expect that school
deregulation would be more popular among affluent, white parents and teacher
aides than among poorer, minority parents or education professionals. In
fact, some anecdotal evidence suggests that the primary supporters of school
reform proposals such as school choice have been businesses and affluent
parent groups, while most of the teachers' organizations have firmly opposed
reforms that do not involve more money for education (Finn 1992).
Care must be taken in interpreting our results however. Recent surveys
regarding school choice via a voucher system have found that minority urban
residents are supporters of vouchers (Lieberman 1993). We emphasize that our
deregulation results correspond to greater choice with respect to resources
used in the production of education and do not reflect the outcome of greater
demand-side choice. Because the student inputs entering the distance function
are treated as fixed, the simulation does not model demand-side choice. We
also point out that the deregulation simulation is relative to the best
practice technology currently employed by school districts operating in the
public sector. Since private and public schools may produce a different mix
of educational public goods(for example, private schools might promote
religious themes while public schools might promote cultural diversity and
integration), the deregulation simulation does not measure how well the public
17schools in our sample would perform if they operated as private schools
outside the confines of the public sector.
This simulation is fairly conservative in the sense that school
districts are only allowed to reallocate within the bounds of their initial
personnel budgets, given average personnel salaries. Because we assume that
all teachers are paid the average salary in their school district, we do not
allow for the substitution of less experienced teachers for more experienced
(and presumably more expensive) teachers. Because Hanushek (1986) found no
systematic correlation between expensive teacher characteristics--like
educational attainment and experience--and student achievement gains, such
substitutions could be cost effective. On the other hand, we do allow for
reallocation across individual schools within a school district.
The simulation also represents potential changes in school district
allocations. If school districts are sufficiently insulated from market
forces, they may not respond to deregulation by reallocating resources to
maximize their output. However, the reasonably low level of technical
inefficiency in the initial allocation suggests that school districts do face
some incentives to operate on the production possibilities frontier and,
therefore, that our approach is a credible simulation of school district
behavior after deregulation.
We also note that, as with any analysis, there may be room for
improvement. We would like to replicate the simulation using data on
individual schools rather than school districts, and incorporating data on
private schools. While we feel that value added in basic skills is a
reasonable measure of school district output, one might also wish to include
other types of outputs such as graduation rates, school continuation rates or
some measure of labor-force outcomes.
18However, as the empirical appendix demonstrates, the estimation is
fairly robust to a number of alternative model specifications. These
alternative models check for robustness with respect to analyzing nonurban as
well as urban school districts, allowing school districts to face a variable
returns to scale technology, allowing enrollment outside the range of 1,000-
5,000 students, and using average TEAMS scores rather than values added as the
measures of school district output. 14 The Spearman correlation coefficients
for the rank of the school district GAIN score across the various models
indicated a significant positive correlation. Significant differences between
resource-constrained and regulation-constrained school districts persist
across the alternative specifications. For all of the alternative models,
resource-constrained school districts have a greater proportion of poorer,
minority students than regulation-constrained school districts.
Conclusions
To identify the distributional consequences of a basic component of
educational reform, we simulate the deregulation of 144 school districts in
Texas by using a distance-function methodology. This approach allows us to
model school districts as producers of a vector of net improvements in student
achievement, given student characteristics. By comparing the direct and
indirect distance functions, we can simulate the potential gains in
achievement from removing restrictions on the use of school district personnel
while requiring that school districts remain within the financial constraints
of their initial budgets.
14 For comparability, all of these alternative specifications maintain
the same number of inputs and outputs.
19Our simulation indicates that there are substantial differences in the
consequences of school reform for different educational interest groups.
Parents and students in school districts that are poor and have a relatively
high proportion of minority students have little to gain from deregulation.
These schools seem to be resource constrained rather than regulation
constrained. On average, they are already using their inputs more efficiently
than wealthier school districts with fewer minority students. In contrast,
school districts that would gain from deregulation tend to have relatively few
minority students, relatively few poor students and substantial property
wealth per pupil. Furthermore, the potential gains from deregulation increase
as property wealth and expenditures per student increase. Therefore, we would
expect that affluent parents would prefer educational reforms that deregulate
schools, while poorer parents, who are less likely to gain from deregulation,
would prefer educational reforms that redistribute schooling resources among
schools.
Our simulation also indicates that deregulation and incentives for
increased efficiency, would, on average, lead many school districts to
substitute teacher aides for teachers, administrators and professional staff
such as guidance counselors. Apparently, many education professionals are
extracting rents (in terms of excess employment) from the current system.
Therefore, it is rational for these groups to oppose educational reform.
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22Technical Appendix
There are several ways to calculate Do(Xf'X",y) and IDo(Xf'Pv/c,y).
Here we use the nonparametric linear programming approach, which is closely
related to data envelopment analysis (DEA). In this approach, we exploit the
reciprocal relationship between Farrell technical efficiency and the distance
functions. Specifically, for each school district i-I,.....1, we calculate
(AI)
subject to




Z1 ~ 0 I i = 1, ... ,I
23The intensity vector z serves to construct convex combinations of the
data to form the reference sets P(Xf'Xv) and IP(Xf'Pv/c). The restriction
that the intensity variables be nonnegative allows the technology to exhibit
constant returns to scale.' Note that the choice variables for the direct
distance function (Al) are 0 and Z, while the choice variables for the
indirect distance function problem (A2) are A, Z and X". The prime notation
denotes data for the observation (school district) under evaluation; thus Xi'"
refers to the observed vector of personnel inputs for school district i'. On
the other hand, Xv in the third set of constraints for the indirect distance
function problem (A2) is a variable for which we solve.
Problems Al and A2 are solved for each school district in our sample.
For details, see Fare et al. (1988, 1993) or Fare and Grosskopf (1993).
1 Variable returns to scale may be imposed by adding the constraint that




3rd Grade 5th Grade 9th Grade 11th Grade
Intercept 676.37 616.90 431. 21 417.63
(27.97) (25.70) (31.25) (20.55)
TEAMS 87math,j 0.03 0.03 0,08 0.24
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
TEAMS 87reading, j 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.25
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
TEAMS87",riti.ng,j 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
ASIAN 0.45 0.49 0.31 0.30
(0.71) (0.61) (0.55) (0.35)
BLACK -0.01 -0.13 -0.23 -0.24
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
HISPANIC -0.01 -0.003 -0.09 -0.15
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
XCOHORT j -.48 -0.38 -0.40 -0.35
(0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
SES -0.75 -0.57 -0.28 -0.17
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
Notes: System-weighted R-square is 0.4510.
Number of observations is 604.
25Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Variable Inputs
AD 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.014
TEACH 0.060 0.005 0.046 0.078
SUP 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.011
AIDES 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.030
Variable Input Prices
AD PAY $38,612 3659 $30,409 $52,920
TEACH PAY 23,008 1595 20,166 29,509
SUP PAY 27,049 2491 21,736 37,101
AIDE PAY 9,514 1492 6,898 14,109
Fixed Inputs
STUINPUT, 140.5 23.8 63.9 177.8
STUINPUT5 188.8 24.3 99.6 239.3
STUINPUT9 359.7 22.5 281.4 406.6
STUINPUTll 368.2 20.0 310.1 417.9
MAINT 361.1 116.3 141.8 736.7
Outputs (Value-added test scores by grade)
OUTPUT, 676.7 25.6 568.5 749.5
OUTPUT5 616.3 22.0 538.8 680.2
OUTPUT9 429.1 21.2 377.6 487.1
OUTPUTll 416.3 11.5 383.4 440.9
Costs and Enrollment
VARCOST/ENROLL $1,827.1 250.6 $1,299.2 $2,676.7
ENROLL 2,637.9 1,225.1 1,010.0 4,995.0
26Table 3





(De(Xf,Xv,y»-l 1.032 1.039 1.0000
(0.038) (0.039) (0.000)
(IDe (Xf,Pv/c,y) )-1 1.074 1.090 1.0000
(0.057) (0.051) (0.000)
GAIN 1.041 1.049 1.0000
(0.035) (0.033) (0.000)
Observations 144 119 25
Table 4
How Deregulation Affects Sample Spending on Personnel
Expenditures: Teachers Administrators Staff Aides Total
(in millions)
Status quo $525.0 $79.8 $59.15 $30.6 $694.5
Deregulation:
constant cost 520.7 67.5 51. 0 55.2 $694.5
constant output 483.7 62.8 47.4 51. 0 $644.9
Note: Rows may not sum due to rounding.
27Table 5
Mean Characteristics of





STATE AID PER STUDENT $1,511.69 $2073.20
(51. 20) (81. 93)






MARKET VALUE PER STUDENT $185,260 $80,024
(13,089) (8,764)
OBSERVATIONS 119 25
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Effects on Total Personnel Expenditures
(in millions)
N Teachers Administrators Staff Aides
Model I
Status Quo 144 525.0 79.8 59.1 30.6
Deregulation:
constant cost 144 520. 7 67.5 51.0 55.2
constant output 144 483. 7 62.8 47.4 51.0
Model II
Status Quo 144 525. 0 79.8 59.1 30.6
Deregulation:
constant cost 144 511. 9 76.7 53.9 50.3
Model III
Status Quo 314 1041.9 148.9 114.4 66.7
Deregulation:
constant cost 314 1023.2 134.9 101.6 112.1
constant output 314 949.8 125.4 94.2 103.6
Model IV
Status Quo 314 1041.9 148.9 114.4 66.7
Deregulation:
constant cost 314 1036.3 145.4 104.1 83.4
Model V
Status Quo 425 3681.3 496.8 453.2 222.8
Deregulation:
constant cost 425 3664.5 472.2 399.2 318.0
constant output 425 3364.8 434.0 366.3 292 .5
Model VI
Status Quo 425 3681. 3 496.8 453.2 222.8
Deregulation:
constant cost 425 3646.5 488.7 397.6 321.1







As reported in text, constant returns to scale (eRS) , enrollment 1,000-5,000, urban school
districts.
Variable returns to scale (VRS), enrollment 1.000-5,000, urban school districts.
eRS, enrollment 1,000-5,000, urban and non-urban school districts.
VRS, enrollment 1,000-5,000, urban and non-urban school districts.
eRS, no upper bound on enrollment, urban and non-urban school districts.
eRS, TEAMS average scores (rather than value added) for output! no upper bound on
enrollment! urban and non-urban school districts.
29Empirical Appendix cont.
Mean Characteristics of Regulation-Constrained (G)
and Resource-Constrained (NG) School Districts
Model I Model II Model III
G NG G NG G NG
GAIN 1.049 1.00 1.012 1.00 1.046 1.00
VARCOST 1855.4 1692.4 1845.9 1776.4 1882.1 1703.8
STATE AID
PER STUDENT 1511.7 2073.2 1534.8 1809.5 1558.2 2067.5
EXPENDITURE
PER STUDENT 3297.4 2850.8 3259.8 3112.3 3255.6 2846.5
NONWHITE 26.50 57.14 26.22 46.89 32.14 57.54
SES 26.23 53.68 26.29 43.66 32.51 54.15
OBSERVATIONS 119 25 105 39 284 30
Model IV Model V Model VI
G NG G NG G NG
GAIN 1.016 1.00 1.050 1.00 1.026 1.00
VARCOST 1874.1 1810.9 1868.5 1723.9 1867.1 1743.4
STATE AID
PER STUDENT 1569.6 1827.5 1542.7 2095.6 1541.3 2014.6
EXPENDITURE
PER STUDENT 3224.0 3171.7 3229.7 2872.0 3232.5 2906.6
NONWHITE 31.98 50.08 34.96 68.09 34.76 64.35
SES 32.33 47.99 32.40 62.26 32.28 58.34
OBSERVATIONS 269 45 391 34 384 41
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